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This Article poses the basic question that is reflected in its title and that
was the subject of the conference where the Article was initially presented:
whether technology poses any threats to the mission of compliance and the
position of compliance officers, whether it is just another useful tool for
them, or whether it is something of both. It begins by explaining the origin
of compliance in broker-dealers and investment advisers and its important
current position in those firms. It then discusses why compliance officers
have always been drawn to technology, particularly to keep up with the
business sides of the firms for which they work—a need made more acute
because of technological developments in the securities industry. After
setting forth the question inspiring the conference, chiefly, what will be the
effect of the use of new technology on compliance, the Article next
articulates the following hypothesis: that more use of this technology in
compliance—termed “dashboard compliance”—will increase the
productivity of compliance officers, decrease their numbers, emphasize
“legal” compliance, which is designed to ensure that the firm and its
employees comply with the law, and diminish “values” compliance, which
encourages conduct in line with firm and industry values. It then looks at
the preliminary evidence, drawn from industry reports and enforcement
actions of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), as to whether this
hypothesis is supported. It observes that compliance officers are finding it
necessary to use dashboard compliance, and that the SEC and FINRA are
encouraging this use. It also finds that dashboard compliance is making
compliance officers more productive and suggests, albeit weakly, that this
enhanced productivity might result in a loss of compliance officer positions,
as firms make investments in technology at the expense of hiring or
retaining human compliance officers. Finally, the Article observes that
there is little evidence so far about a negative effect on “values”
compliance from the use of dashboard compliance. Indeed, other outcomes
are possible, such as dashboard compliance liberating compliance officers
from many mundane tasks of legal compliance and giving them more time
for values compliance. The Article concludes by recommending that, while
* James A. Fanto is the Gerald Baylin Professor of Law and Co-Director for the Center of
the Study of Business Law & Regulation, Brooklyn Law School. I am grateful for the comments
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the final outcome for dashboard compliance is unclear, in coming years
compliance practitioners should remain alert to its possible effects to
ensure that they try to maintain all that is valuable about compliance.
INTRODUCTION
This Article is intended to provide background to the other papers in
this issue, which were presented at a conference on compliance and
technology.1 It thus highlights several reasons why a conference on the
topic of compliance and technology is timely. Over the past years,
compliance has become an important control function in financial firms,2
even if it has been around, at least among broker-dealers, since the 1970s.3
It has particularly gained importance since the financial crisis, which
resulted in Congress and regulators imposing more onerous obligations on
most financial firms.4 Our Center for the Study of Business Law &
Regulation at Brooklyn Law School reflects the importance of compliance
by having, as one of its missions, the study of developments in this field.
This focus is partly due to the fact that many of our alumni have made
careers in compliance and assumed important compliance positions in
financial firms.5
While compliance has pursued an upward path, there has been an
unrelated but continuous development in the growth of information
technology, which, among other things, makes possible enhanced analysis
1. The conference was entitled “The Role of Technology in Compliance in Financial
Services: An Indispensable Tool as well as a Threat?,” held at Brooklyn Law School on March 4,
2016. I thank all those who provided me with comments on the presentation that was the basis for
this article.
2. The financial firms that will be the focus of the discussion below are broker-dealers and
investment advisers registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 11, 89 Stat. 97 (1975)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012)) (registration of broker-dealers); Exchange Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2012)).
3. For an early work on broker-dealer compliance, see generally SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
GUIDE TO BROKER-DEALER COMPLIANCE, REPORT OF THE BROKER-DEALER MODEL
COMPLIANCE PROGRAM ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (1974) [hereinafter GUIDE TO BROKER-DEALER COMPLIANCE] (report done by an
industry group at the direction of the SEC).
4. The obligations have grown as a result of Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank). See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 of U.S.C.) and the rulemaking
associated with it.
5. This is demonstrated by the careers of the commenters to the papers presented at the
conference, who, for the most part, are compliance practitioners and alumni of our school. They
included alumni such as Jane Kanter, Chief Operating Officer of ARK Investment Manager, LLC;
Rebecca Sheinberg, Principal, The Carlyle Group; Jonathan Gottlieb, Managing Director, Senior
Counsel, RBS Securities; and H.J. Willcox, Managing Director & Chief Compliance Officer,
AQR Capital Management.
2016] Dashboard Compliance: Benefit, Threat, or Both? 3
of data (i.e., data analytics).6 This development is influencing conduct in all
kinds of domains and activities, from basic communications to job
structure. Not surprisingly, information technology is affecting compliance
and the nature of the compliance officer position in the private sector. From
one perspective comes the classic story about technology: information
technology is simply providing modern compliance officers with more
tools, much in the way that previous technological advances, like the
telephone, did for their predecessors.7 Encouraged by their firms and by
regulators, compliance officers are using the technology, which makes them
more productive, efficient, and effective.
There are, however, less positive outcomes that could arise from
compliance officers’ use of new technology. One is a recurring concern
about technology—while it increases the productivity of those engaged in a
particular task, it may reduce, or eliminate the need for, the number of
people doing some or all of that task. As discussed below,8 this is a possible
outcome arising from the intersection of compliance and technology today.
There are other related potential outcomes as well. Technology may
transform the position of compliance officers by putting them behind the
computer screen, whence they receive an enormous amount of data about
activities in their firms. This model, which may be valued by the firms for
its cost savings and by regulators for its comprehensiveness, may reduce or
eliminate the time that a compliance officer will have for other tasks, such
as “walking the halls” to influence informally the conduct of others in
firms. This new model of compliance made possible by technology—what I
shall call here “dashboard compliance”9—carries the risk that a critical
aspect of compliance may be devalued or neglected.
Given these possibly competing outcomes, it is timely to explore the
relationship between compliance and technology, which was the goal of the
conference that produced the Articles for this issue. In general, this
exploration is not intended to spark resistance to technological advances, an
approach of dubious success in any case. Rather, understanding the uses of
technology and their effects will allow compliance practitioners and
policymakers to propose strategies for those uses that maintain the goals of
compliance, while also taking advantage of technology’s benefits.
6. See generally SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER 151–70 (2011) (discussing how new
technology changes human conduct). On the use of “big data” generally, see FED. TRADE
COMM’N, BIGDATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? (2016).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 31–32.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 72–74.
9. I used this term in a blog, which was based upon the presentation that is the basis for this
Article. See James Fanto, Dashboard Compliance: What Will Be its Consequences?, N.Y.U.
PROGRAM ON CORP. COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT: COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT BLOG
(June 15, 2016), https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2016/06/15/dashboard-compliance-
what-will-be-its-consequences.
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I first sets forth a basic
description of compliance and several assumptions about its nature. Part I
then discusses why compliance officers are interested in using technology
today. Part II poses the basic question reflected in the title of this Article
and in the subject of the conference: whether technology poses any threats
to the mission of compliance and the position of compliance officers, or
whether it is just another useful tool for the officers. After articulating this
question and related inquiries, Part II presents the following hypothesis:
technology enhances what shall be described below as “legal” compliance
and may adversely affect another kind of compliance, known as “values”
compliance. Part III looks at the preliminary evidence, drawn from industry
reports and enforcement actions of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA), as to whether this hypothesis is supported. Part III also draws
implications from the evidence and points to directions for further research.
This Article concludes by observing that, while the final outcome for
dashboard compliance is unclear, in coming years compliance practitioners
should be alert to the ways in which it could reinforce certain tasks in legal
compliance, and undercut those tasks characteristic of values compliance.
I. COMPLIANCE AND THE ATTRACTION OF TECHNOLOGY
A. COMPLIANCE
It is important to identify at the outset the reason for compliance in
broker-dealers and investment advisers. To put it simply, firms have a legal
obligation to ensure that their employees and agents comply with the law
and regulation. This obligation arises from firms’ statutory duty of
supervision, a duty also imposed upon their supervisors.10 That is, if
securities law violations occur in these regulated firms, the firms, as well as
the supervisors of the violators, may be charged by the SEC (and, for
broker-dealers, by FINRA) for their failure to supervise so as to have
prevented the violations. There are, however, statutory defenses to this
liability available to the firm and its supervisors, which essentially establish
what is reasonable supervision. To take advantage of these defenses, a firm
must: set up supervisory procedures and a system to ensure that all
employees and agents, and their transactions and other dealings, are
supervised so as to prevent violations of the law, make sure that there is
10. For broker-dealers, this duty is in 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2012). Exchange Act, Pub. L.
No. 94-29, § 11, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2012)). The
supervisors in broker-dealers have this duty because of 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6)(A)(i). 15 U.S.C. §
78o(b)(6)(A)(i). This subparagraph cross-references violations enumerated under section 15
U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4), including the supervisory liability of section 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E). 15
U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(4), 78o(b)(4)(E). Investment advisers (and their associated persons) have this
duty under 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(e)(6) & (f). 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(e)(6), 80b-3(f).
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adequate staffing and resources for the system in relation to the business of
the firm, and then put the system into effect. Effectiveness of the system is
often demonstrated by the fact that the firm identifies, and follows up on,
indications of possible legal violations and punishes violators.11
The statutory defense is available only if employees in the firm know
their legal obligations and the necessary conduct to satisfy them, and the
firm’s supervisors enforce this conduct. This is where the compliance
function and compliance officers come in. Compliance officers keep track
of all the legal, regulatory, and other obligations imposed upon a firm and
its employees, and they design policies and procedures that guide
employees in how to comply with the obligations.12 They also train the
employees in these policies and procedures. Moreover, given that firm
supervisors are focused on the business of the firm and that compliance
officers are specialists in policies and procedures, the latter generally have
the additional task of monitoring the employees’ conduct for compliance
with the policies and procedures and investigating actual or potential
violations of the law or regulation.13
This Article is not the place to review the history of compliance in
broker-dealers and investment advisers.14 Suffice it to say that the
compliance function and compliance officers have existed in broker-dealers
since at least the 1970s, shortly after the supervisory duty, discussed above,
was imposed on these firms.15 Compliance received a significant impetus in
2004, when the then National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD,
which is now FINRA) imposed an obligation on broker-dealers to have a
chief compliance officer (CCO) and when the SEC did the same for
11. For broker-dealers, the defenses are in 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E)(i)–(ii), whereas for
investment advisers they are in 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(e)(6)(A) & (B). See 15 U.S.C. §§
78o(b)(4)(E)(i)–(ii), 80b-3(e)(6)(A)–(B). For a discussion of the origin of this statutory duty of
supervision in broker-dealers, see James Fanto, The Vanishing Supervisor, 41 J. CORP. L. 117,
128–44 (2015) (providing the statutory framework and the legislative and industry history for it).
12. See SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, COMPLIANCE& LEGAL DIVISION, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF
COMPLIANCE 4 (2005). “Policies” are general statements of the goals of the conduct or the basic
obligations involved in an area; “procedures” are detailed guidance as to how to meet the policies.
See generally GEOFFREY PARSONS MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT,
AND COMPLIANCE 171–74 (2014) (discussing compliance policies and referring to procedures as
part of the compliance program); INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, COMPLIANCE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS—GUIDELINES, ISO 19600 20 (2014) (“Procedures should be established,
documented, implemented and maintained to support the compliance policy and translate the
compliance obligations into practice.”).
13. For a full discussion of the activities of compliance officers in broker-dealers, see James A.
Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor: A Reorientation in Compliance for Broker-Dealers, 2014 BYU
L. REV. 1121, 1143–48 (2014) (describing the basic tasks of compliance officers).
14. This history is discussed in more detail in Fanto, supra note 14, at 1130–43 (for broker-
dealers). On the history of compliance in advisers, see JAMES A. FANTO, MUTUAL FUND
COMPLIANCE: KEY DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
MUTUAL FUNDS (John D. Morely & William A. Birdthistle, eds., forthcoming 2016).
15. See, e.g., GUIDE TO BROKER-DEALER COMPLIANCE, supra note 4.
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registered investment advisers and investment companies.16 In particular,
both the NASD and the SEC emphasized in their regulations how critical
the CCO and the compliance function were for ensuring that firms and their
employees complied with their legal obligations. These regulations also
raised the profile of compliance in the firms by, among other things,
requiring that the CCO prepare a report and meet with the chief executive
and the board on compliance matters.17
In the years following 2004, compliance in broker-dealers and
investment advisers has become significant, particularly as an increasing
number of legal obligations have been imposed upon firms and their
personnel, especially after the financial crisis of 2007–2008. As specialists
in what I call “legal” compliance, which is designed to ensure that the firm
and its employees comply with the law,18 compliance officers have seen
their status in firms rise. The SEC and FINRA have emphasized the critical
importance of this function and have established regular interactions with
compliance officers, whom the agencies regard as their collaborators within
firms.19 Compliance officers have become conscious of the special nature of
their position, seeking recognition that compliance is in fact an important
and value-providing profession.20
There is another origin of compliance, which in effect points to a kind
of compliance that complements or accompanies legal compliance. This is a
values or ethics-based approach—call it “values” compliance—that
encourages conduct in line with firm and industry values.21 As for origins,
one could point to the longstanding values-based admonition in the
brokerage industry that business should be conducted in accordance with
“high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of
trade.”22 Another source is the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which
16. For the rule requiring a CCO in broker-dealers, see Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Annual
Compliance Certification and Designation of Chief Compliance Officer, Notice to Members 04-
79, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (Nov. 2004), http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/
NoticeDocument/p011955.pdf. For the imposition of the CCO requirement in investment advisers
and investment companies, see Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment
Advisers, Advisers Act Release No. 2204, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714 (Dec. 24, 2003) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 270, 275 and 279 (2016)). For a general discussion of the origins of these compliance
rules, see John H. Walsh, Institution-Based Financial Regulation: A Third Paradigm, 49 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 381, 389–99 (2008). John Walsh was a commenter at the conference and is an expert on
the history of compliance.
17. See FINRA RULE 3130(c) (for broker-dealers); 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1(a)(4) (2016) (for
investment companies). This meeting is not made explicit in the investment adviser rule. See 17
C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7.
18. See supra text accompanying notes 13–14.
19. See Fanto, supra note 14, at 1146 (discussing this interaction).
20. See id. at 1142–43. On the professional mission of compliance officers, see generally JOHN
H. WALSH, COMPLIANCE AS A PROFESSION, MODERN COMPLIANCE: BEST PRACTICES IN
SECURITIES AND FINANCE (John H. Walsh & David H. Lui, eds., 2015).
21. See Fanto, supra note 14, at 1160–67 (discussing the internal approach to compliance).
22. For its current version, see FINRA RULE 2010.
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encourage organizations to have compliance programs that promote both
legal and ethical conduct by their employees and agents.23 In the securities
industry, the SEC and FINRA often speak of the importance of the “culture
of compliance” in a firm and the need for compliance officers to promote
it.24
Under the values compliance approach, employees would learn proper
ways to think and to conduct themselves in accordance with the values or
culture of the firm.25 The values are taught to employees by compliance
instruction, just as this instruction teaches them about their legal
obligations. However, employees also learn about values compliance
through example, as they watch how others make decisions and conduct
themselves in the firm. Just as compliance officers are specialists in legal
obligations, they understand the firm’s values and help draft and maintain
its code of conduct or ethics. Indeed, surveys of compliance officers
highlight their belief that the promotion of values is the main task of
compliance, even above maintaining compliance with laws and
regulations.26 Accordingly, compliance officers might contribute to values
compliance when they provide examples of proper decision making and
conduct, generally by offering advice to and counseling those in the firm.
From the values compliance perspective, it is important to have compliance
officers “on the ground” in a firm, available and involved in most decisions
and transactions, if only to remind decision makers about the values that
should guide their decisions.27
23. See FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 8B2.1 (FEDERAL SENTENCING COMM’N 2004)
(describing criteria for an “effective compliance and ethics program”). On the Sentencing
Guidelines and their influence on compliance, see Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an
Era of Compliance, 57 WM. &MARY L. REV. 2075, 2084 (2016). Professor Griffith was a speaker
at the conference and is a contributor to this issue.
24. See, e.g., Andrew J. Donohue, Chief of Staff, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, New Directions in
Corporate Compliance: Keynote Luncheon Speech, Rutgers Law School Center for Corporate
Law and Governance (May 20, 2016). Speaking of compliance, Donohue notes:
I can’t stress enough the critical role a firm’s culture has on its corporate compliance
program and its effectiveness. A culture of always doing the right thing, not tolerating
bad practices or bad actors is essential. The culture should encourage people to ask
questions and to discuss openly what is the proper response to a particular issue and
how conflicts should be resolved. It should hold the higher up members of the firm to at
least the same standard of conduct as those below them. I have always thought that the
higher up you were in an organization, the less tolerant the firm should be of your non-
compliance. If that is the culture of the firm that sends a powerful message within an
organization.
Id.
25. For more discussion on values or internal compliance, see Fanto, supra note 14, at 1160–
70.
26. See INGRID FREDEEN, NAVEX GLOB., 2015 ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE TRAINING
BENCHMARK REPORT 7 (2015).
27. For a seminal article on values compliance, see generally Gary R. Weaver & Linda Klebe
Trevino, Compliance and Values Oriented Ethics Programs: Influences on Employees’ Attitudes
and Behavior, 9 BUS. ETHICSQ. 315 (1999).
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Legal and values compliance are not meant to be exclusive compliance
approaches; rather, they are complementary in a firm’s efforts to achieve
effective compliance. Certainly, employees have to know their legal
obligations and be monitored as to their compliance with them, which is the
domain of legal compliance. Yet there must also be values and an
organizational culture that animate an employee’s legal compliance and
encourage him or her to go beyond compliance with just the letter of the
law. For example, if a firm’s culture is to encourage putting the customer
first, employees may be urged to act in the customer’s best interest and to
forego a profit opportunity, even when it is legally permissible to take it.28
Compliance officers actively participate in both legal and values
compliance, which is why the head of compliance is often referred to as a
chief ethics and compliance officer (CECO).29
B. THEATTRACTION OFCOMPLIANCEOFFICERS TO TECHNOLOGY
From the early days of compliance, compliance officers in broker-
dealers used technology to perform their tasks. A 1974 compliance
handbook suggested that a compliance officer take advantage of data
processing as it existed then.30 This attraction to technology is not
surprising, because the financial activities that compliance officers regulate
internally have themselves been significantly transformed by technology.
Indeed, several participants in our conference—and contributors to this
issue—have addressed the role of technology in finance in their work.31
For example, finance professionals have embraced technology that
enables them to take instantaneous advantage of information in their trading
activities. Technology speeds up transactions and makes possible new
trading strategies, such as high frequency trading. It also allows for the
development of algorithms to “mine” data so as to produce profitable
trading strategies.32 Because compliance officers must assist in the
oversight of these trading activities, they have both to understand the
trading activities well enough to explain how they must be done in
compliance with the law and regulation, and they must use similar
28. See Donohue, supra note 25 (“It is also telling in a firm when questions are being asked,
conflicts being resolved or decisions being made, is the discussion solely about whether we can do
this or is it also about whether we should do this? Is it the right decision or course of action for the
firm and its clients? I always appreciated how extremely difficult it would be to have
responsibility for the corporate compliance function within a firm that did not have a good
culture.”).
29. See ETHICS & COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF HIGH-QUALITY
ETHICS & COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS: REPORT OF ECI’S BLUE RIBBON PANEL 17 n.17 (2016)
(using the term “chief ethics and compliance officer”).
30. See GUIDE TO BROKER-DEALER COMPLIANCE, supra note 4, at 267–72 (describing the
uses of electronic data processing for tasks by the “Compliance Official”).
31. See, e.g., Tom W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678 (2013) (discussing the
new kinds of investor made possible by advances in technology).
32. See id. at 687–93 (surveying the use of technology in finance).
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technology to keep up with analyzing the activities for compliance
purposes. How can a compliance officer monitor trading that occurs in
milliseconds unless he or she has a technological tool that can follow this
trading, identify problems occurring within it, and even stop it if it violates
certain restrictions?
Moreover, technology could simplify major compliance tasks, as
discussed below. Technology can help compliance officers review email
and other electronic communications, by using certain keywords or terms,
to identify and flag those communications that are suspicious.33 Training
employees in their legal obligations can be done through web-based
courses.34 A compliance officer can do web-based searches to check the
background of potential employees and review the conduct and activities of
existing employees.35 Even traditional “face-to-face” compliance activities,
such as providing compliance advice and inspecting offices, can be effected
through new technological tools.36 It would thus be surprising if compliance
officers did not want to use technology in their compliance work.
II. QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS
This Part presents the question raised by compliance officers’ use of
technology, which was the background question of the Brooklyn Law
School conference: do current uses of technology in compliance pose any
problems or threats to the position of compliance officers in broker-dealers
or investment advisers? This question in turn leads to subsidiary questions,
which point to different practical outcomes. Will the use of technology, like
that of so many past technological advances, simply benefit compliance
officers, generally because technology increases their productivity in their
compliance tasks? This increase in productivity could have negative
consequences by reducing the need for compliance officers, as individual
officers become more productive, and thus by justifying firms’ eliminating
compliance positions. Aside from this possible decline in the number of
compliance officers, will there be any other negative consequences to
33. Broker-dealers have a supervisory obligation to conduct this review of communications.
See FINRA RULE 3110(b)(4).
34. See SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, WHITE PAPER: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF
COMPLIANCE 22 (2013) (discussing training responsibilities of compliance officers, including the
use of electronic training tools).
35. See FINRA RULE 3110(e) (imposing a requirement on firms to investigate those who work
for them). Compliance officers must be concerned about the outside activities of firm personnel
because there is a risk that these activities may implicate the firm, such as where a broker or
adviser uses his or her position with the firm to gain clients for an outside business activity.
Moreover, if the outside activity involves securities, the firm should be involved in supervising it.
See, e.g., FINRA RULE 3280 (on private securities transactions of persons associated with the
member firm).
36. See FINRA RULE 3110(c) (on internal inspections in the firm). Firms are also required to
have an annual meeting with each broker and supervisor on compliance matters. See FINRA RULE
3110(a)(7). This can be done electronically. See FINRA RULE 3110.04 Supplementary Material.
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compliance from the use of technology? In particular, will the use
undermine in any way values compliance, which, as noted above, is
accomplished by a compliance officer who is “on the ground” providing
advice and counseling, while also serving as an example of proper decision
making and conduct?
This Article offers the following preliminary hypothesis about the
effects of the use of technology on compliance: technology will enhance the
productivity of compliance officers, particularly, but not exclusively, as to
legal compliance. This productivity, which results from the efficiency of
compliance officers engaged in dashboard compliance, will also arrest the
growth in, and possibly decrease, the number of compliance officers,
because firms will decide that an investment in technology for compliance
officers should produce a cost savings on the personnel side. Both these
results, i.e., the enhanced productivity and the decreased number of
compliance officers, will mean that fewer officers will be “on the ground,
walking the halls”37 to provide advice and to counsel firm employees.
Moreover, under this hypothesis, the remaining compliance officers will be
busy with their compliance dashboards, which basically focus on legal
compliance. This focus, as well as the potential loss of compliance officers,
will adversely affect values compliance. Finally, any enhancement to values
compliance resulting from the use of technology cannot compensate for the
losses it suffers.
The goal of Part III is informally to test the above hypothesis by
looking at initial—admittedly limited—data, in the form of compliance
industry reviews and representative compliance cases.38 First, it is useful to
look in more detail at how compliance officers are currently using new
technologies, because this use is the basis for the transformation in the
complianceofficer role. Second, it is necessary to inquire whether there is
any evidence that compliance officers are becoming more productive as a
result of this dashboard compliance and to ask what the effects have been
on compliance generally. Third and finally, it is important to look for any
available data on the answer to the most important question: whether, if
technology has increased the productivity of compliance officers, it has had
any disproportionately adverse effects on values compliance specifically.
III. THE EVIDENCE
A.MOREABOUTCOMPLIANCE’SUSE OF TECHNOLOGY
The first factual inquiry looks for evidence of whether compliance
officers are using technology to accomplish compliance tasks and which
37. See Donohue, supra note 25 (advising compliance officers to “‘walk the floor;’ [i]t has
been surprising to me how important it is to get out among the people doing the work”).
38. A comprehensive evaluation of the evidence would demand a much larger study and
article.
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tasks are facilitated by dashboard compliance. Data in response to this
inquiry is easy to find and comes from numerous sources. Practice-oriented
literature on compliance underscores that compliance officers are
increasingly turning to dashboards to assist them in their compliance
tasks.39 Indeed, an attendee at a typical compliance officer convention, such
as the annual meeting of the National Association of Compliance
Professionals,40 must walk through a gauntlet of technology providers, who
offer trinkets to entice compliance officers to stop by their booth in order to
watch the provider demonstrate the latest technological product.41
General surveys of and reports on compliance in financial services
reflect increased investment by firms in technological tools that help
compliance officers accomplish compliance tasks, particularly monitoring
employees for compliance with their legal obligations.42 One of the
conclusions reached by these reports is that compliance officers must use
technology, because otherwise they cannot adequately perform certain
tasks, such as reviewing electronic communications made by employees or
ensuring that data privacy is being maintained.43 The reports conclude that,
if anything, compliance officers are not using technology as efficiently as
they could. The tool of data management,44 and especially data analytics,
where large amounts of firm data are automatically reviewed to identify
trends and problems, particularly highlights this conclusion.45 In fact, the
39. See, e.g., Shannan Layette et al., Best Practices for Selecting Governance Risk and
Compliance Software, in PRACTICAL COMPLIANCE & RISK MANAGEMENT FOR THE SECURITIES
INDUSTRY 19 (2014) (discussing how to select this software).
40. See generally Registration: National Society of Compliance Professionals, NAT’L SOC’Y
OF COMPLIANCE PROF’L NAT’L CONFERENCE, http://nscpconferences.org/national/ (last visited
Sept. 7, 2016).
41. I can attest to this experience myself because I attended the convention in 2014 and walked
through such a gauntlet.
42. A PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) report focusing on banking and capital markets
(presumably broker-dealers) emphasizes the growing use of governance, risk management, and
compliance technology by firms in this industry. See PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, STATE OF
COMPLIANCE 2015: MOVING BEYOND THE BASELINE BANKING AND CAPITAL MARKETS
INDUSTRY BRIEF 10–11 (2015) (explaining the purpose of this use being to increase efficiencies in
certain activities, such as monitoring). A PwC report dealing with asset managers (that is,
investment advisers) emphasizes that their budgets for compliance technology have increased. See
also PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, STATE OF COMPLIANCE 2015: MOVING BEYOND THE
BASELINEASSETMANAGEMENT INDUSTRY BRIEF 5 (2015).
43. See, e.g., SMARSH, 2015 ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS COMPLIANCE SURVEY REPORT
6–7 (2015).
44. See Jason Buffington, Dan Conde & Monya Keane, Information Governance
Considerations in the Financial Services Sector, ENTERPRISE STRATEGY GROUP (June 2015),
http://itbusinessbook.com/admin/admin/books/information-governance-considerations—in-the-
financial-services-sector.pdf (discussing the use of data management for recordkeeping
requirements and for regulatory inquiries).
45. See, e.g., John Verver, The Big Data Opportunity for Audit, Risk Management, and
Compliance, in THE EVOLVING ERA OF BIG DATA 6 (2015) (discussing how compliance officers
must use data analytics to identify compliance failures). See also Bradley Hope, Spy Software
Gets a Second Life on Wall Street, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/spy-
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reports recommend that compliance departments should hire more staff
with technological backgrounds, given the growing importance of
technology utilization by compliance officers.46 It is interesting to note that
surveys of compliance officers also show that they are not always satisfied
with the technology that is available to them, because it does not always
provide or analyze the appropriate data or do exactly the tasks that the
compliance officer needs completed.47
As noted above,48 compliance officers often use technology to keep up
with the financial services industry, which itself uses sophisticated
technology. A paradigmatic statement of this rationale appears in a recent
SEC settlement of an administrative action involving Citigroup Global
Markets, a registered broker-dealer.49 In this case, Citigroup ran into several
legal problems with the oversight of its proprietary trading desks.50
Citigroup failed to monitor compliance by these desks with its “watch list”
(i.e., a list of securities where the firm could not take a trading position
because it possessed inside or confidential information that improperly gave
it a trading advantage over others in the market), and its exception reports51
did not capture principal trades done at these desks with advisory
accounts.52 Citigroup had automated systems to monitor the trading at the
proprietary desks, but the systems were not functioning properly. In setting
forth Citigroup’s deficiencies, the SEC made the following general
software-gets-a-second-life-on-wall-street-1438541720 (describing use of software developed by
the U.S. Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to identify compliance
problems in financial firms); PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, MOVING BEYOND THE BASELINE
LEVERAGING THE COMPLIANCE FUNCTION TO GAIN A COMPETITIVE EDGE 20–21 (2015)
[hereinafter PWC, STATE OF COMPLIANCE] (PwC argues in their general survey of compliance
that compliance must make more use of data analytics, which covers and analyzes all the data in a
particular area).
46. See, e.g., PWC, STATE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 46, at 13–14 (noting that the
background of compliance officers should be expanded to include more with technological and
data analytical expertise).
47. See id. A Deloitte survey echoes this compliance officer unhappiness with technology
solutions, because the solutions are perceived as being inadequate for the required tasks. See also
DELOITTE, COMPLIANCEWEEK, IN FOCUS: 2015 COMPLIANCE TRENDS SURVEY 12 (2015).
48. See supra text accompanying notes 31–32.
49. See generally Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 75,729, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 4178, 2015 WL 4931787 (Aug. 19, 2015).
50. See id. at *2. In proprietary trading, a broker-dealer (or any financial firm for that matter)
is trading securities on its own behalf, rather than for a client, and is not engaged in making a
market in the securities.
51. Id. at *2, *5. An exception report shows activity outside the expected parameters of the
activity in question. See, e.g., David Tilkin, The Landscape of Broker-Dealer Compliance and
Exception Reporting Systems, 17 PIABA B.J. 65 (2010) (discussing the exception report in the
context of automated surveillance systems). It is a key report for compliance officers, because it
tells them what should be investigated.
52. See Citigroup, 2015 WL 4931787, at *8. If a firm, like Citigroup, acts as an investment
adviser for individuals or funds, under the Investment Advisers Act it cannot trade itself as
principal with these advisees without obtaining their prior written consent. See Exchange Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (2012)).
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comment on why the technology-enhanced nature of the firm’s business
required that compliance officers have their own technological capabilities:
As market participants continue to rely on automated systems to conduct
trading, reliable technology systems enable broker-dealers and investment
advisers to fulfill effectively their compliance responsibilities. Technology
oversight is a critical part of modern compliance, including management
of the technology systems that compliance personnel use. Failure to
oversee those systems adequately can lead to compliance failures and
securities law violations.53
As the Citigroup case suggests, the SEC, as well as FINRA, expects
compliance officers to have adequate technological tools to enable them to
fulfill their responsibilities. This is just a contemporary version of the
SEC’s and FINRA’s longstanding position on compliance, namely that it
should have the resources to match the business operations of a firm. The
SEC would previously assert, generally in administrative proceedings, that
if the firm was large and geographically dispersed, the compliance
department and its staff had to reflect the complexity of the organization of
the firm.54 That is, if a firm had many branches and diverse business lines,
the compliance department might need an officer in each branch and should
have certain officers overseeing the various lines. In the technological
version of this argument, the SEC would observe that if the firm’s business
operations involve sophisticated and automated trading—with a
contemporary example being a broker-dealer or adviser specializing in
algorithmic trading—compliance in that firm would need advanced
technological tools to monitor them.55
Today, the SEC criticizes firms for not using technology in compliance
as extensively as they should. Emblematic of this regulatory message is a
recent administrative proceeding involving UBS Financial Services of
Puerto Rico (UBS).56 In that case, the firm allowed its customers to take out
letters of credit (LOC) with an affiliated bank.57 Under the terms of a
typical LOC, the customer could not use its proceeds to purchase securities
in his or her UBS brokerage account; UBS provided margin loans for this
purpose, but at an interest rate greater than that of the LOCs.58 Moreover,
53. See Citigroup, 2015 WL 4931787, at *1.
54. See, e.g., First Affiliated Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 23,335, 35 SEC Docket
1172 (June 18, 1986) (finding the corporation had “inadequate staffing of its compliance
department”).
55. See, e.g., Barclays Capital Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10,010, Exchange Act Release
No. 77,001, 2016 WL 369813 (Jan. 31, 2016) (involving Barclays’s operation of its ATS dark
pool, LX; as part of its remedial efforts, it promises to enhance its compliance over these
activities).
56. See generally UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. of P.R., Exchange Act Release No. 76,013, 2015 WL
5693101 (Sept. 29, 2015).
57. See id. at *1.
58. See id. at *2–3.
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any loans that the bank advanced to the customer under the LOC were
secured by customer assets, including the customer’s securities in the
brokerage account.
An enterprising broker, Ramirez, persuaded his customers to obtain
LOCs, draw down funds from them, transfer the funds to accounts outside
UBS, and then retransfer the money back to their UBS brokerage accounts
and use these proceeds to purchase shares of closed-end funds that were
heavily invested in Puerto Rican municipal bonds.59 In other words, having
customers first place proceeds from the LOCs in outside accounts
sidestepped the prohibition on the LOCs being directly used for securities
purchases.60 Ramirez had multiple incentives to operate this scheme: he got
an origination fee for each LOC and a commission for each customer
purchase of the closed-end fund shares.61 When the funds plunged in value
because of problems associated with the underlying Puerto Rican municipal
bonds, the customers received notices that they needed to put up more
collateral for their LOC loans, and they complained about what the broker
had advised them to do.
As it turned out, the affiliated bank had automated compliance systems
that monitored and presumably detected any transfer of LOC proceeds
directly into a customer’s brokerage account for the purchase of securities.62
The same systems, however, did not pick up indirect transfers, as had
occurred in this case. Moreover, UBS itself failed to update its automated
surveillance systems even after operations personnel had signaled that this
kind of indirect, improper use of LOC proceeds was possible.63
Accordingly, in the SEC’s view, UBS failed to have adequate technology in
its supervisory and compliance programs.64 In an extreme example of the
regulatory push to have firms use compliance technology, the SEC has even
criticized one firm for maintaining its traditional manual surveillance,
without replacing it with, or having as a backup, an automated system.65
Not only does the SEC (and FINRA) criticize firms for not having
adequate, technologically enhanced compliance programs, but it also
provides them with models of what the firms should be doing in this regard.
Today, both the SEC and FINRA publicize their use of data analytics to
identify securities law violations in broker-dealers and investment advisers,
59. See id. at *1.
60. See id.
61. See id. at *3.
62. See id. at *4.
63. See id. at *5.
64. See id.; see also Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., et al., FINRA AWC No. 20120349643, at 9
(Dec. 21, 2015) (failure of automated compliance systems to be designed to identify suspicious
deposit and resale of microcap securities in violation of Section 5).
65. See Carl D. Johns, Advisers Act Release No. 3655, Investment Company Act Release No.
30,675, 2013 WL 4521777 (Aug. 27, 2013) (adviser employee falsifies information provided to
compliance officer; the SEC asks why the firm did not have a backup automated system to check
the veracity of the employee’s representations).
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which is why, incidentally, both regulatory bodies are harsh on firms that
provide them with incomplete or missing data.66 A good example of the
SEC’s and FINRA’s use of “big data” is a recent examination of the sale of
structured products across broker-dealers, which was conducted by the
SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE).67
These products are securities based upon other investments and they are
designed to provide a return in a low-interest environment, but often do not
have much of a track record, are difficult to understand, and are costly.
Here, the OCIE used its own data analytics to identify improper sales of
structured products in brokerage branches throughout the industry, where,
for instance, there were excessive concentrations of the products in
customer accounts or where the products were “unsuitable” for the
customer in question, given his or her investment intent or age.68 Clearly,
the message from this risk alert is that the compliance officers of a broker-
dealer should be using similar data analytics tools to spot or to prevent legal
violations in their own firm.69 In fact, a CCO would likely be uncomfortable
if the SEC or FINRA enforcement staff came to the firm with evidence of
suspicious transactions on the basis of their own analyses, which the firm’s
compliance program had not identified as being worthy of investigation.
B. EVIDENCE OF INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY OFCOMPLIANCE
OFFICERS
An important part of the hypothesis enumerated earlier is that the use of
technology would increase the productivity of compliance officers and,
possibly, result in a decline in their number. Available evidence supports
both propositions, although evidence for the decline is weak. Consultant
reports on compliance refer to significant productivity gains that can arise
from automation and to the cost pressures that firms are experiencing to
reduce their expenses on the compliance function as a result of these
productivity gains. McKinsey discusses in detail how costs are compelling
investment banks to automate services, including in such areas as risk
66. See, e.g., FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/market-regulation (last visited Oct. 3,
2016) (describing the sophistication of FINRA’s surveillance). Both broker-dealers and
investment advisers have extensive reporting obligations, with the formers’ being more extensive.
The SEC and FINRA have always needed the data provided by this reporting so that they can
conduct their own surveillance of regulated firms and the securities markets. Now that they are
using data analytics for this surveillance, they are particularly dependent upon accurate reporting
from the regulated firms.
67. See Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, National Exam Program Risk
Alert, Broker-Dealer Controls Regarding Retail Sales of Structured Securities Products, SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/ocie/announcement/risk-alert-aug-24-2015.
html.
68. See id. at 4–5.
69. See Donohue, supra note 25 (discussing how firms must automate certain compliance
functions).
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management, regulatory reporting, and compliance.70 Its report also
suggests that these financial firms, which are regulated as broker-dealers,
can obtain a 40% productivity gain from automation in risk, reporting, and
compliance, generally (in all but the largest firms) by using third-party
products.71 McKinsey thus projects that firms will invest heavily in “big
data” and data analytics to save on costs and to improve efficiency in risk
management (and presumably compliance).72 Moreover, it specifically
refers to the likely reduction in the need for “voice staff” (i.e., human
beings) as a result of increasingly automated compliance, which it
characterizes as “disruptive,”73 no doubt due to the compliance officers
being displaced. Other industry surveys also report that the compliance
function must become more efficient and reduce costs as a result of overall
cost pressures on firms, and the surveys note the possibility of staff
reductions in compliance.74 In addition, journalists point to a trade-off that
firms are now contemplating: more investment in technology at the expense
of hiring more compliance officers.75
The compliance sector’s recognition that the use of technology could
improve its efficiency is based upon the model of dashboard compliance.76
Under this model, a compliance officer can be envisioned as sitting before a
single or multi-screen computer “dashboard,” to which data from a firm’s
various activities feeds is processed. The model thus primarily highlights
compliance officers’ task of surveillance, where they ensure that employees
are following compliance procedures and conducting their activities in
accordance with the law, regulation, and the firm’s code of conduct. The
dashboard could even allow compliance officers to perform the other
compliance tasks identified above, such as training employees through
online programs, sending out compliance alerts, and complying with
information requests from regulators. Indeed, third-party vendors of
compliance technology advertise and demonstrate how their dashboard
products allow compliance officers to do an increasing number of
compliance tasks from their desks.77 Thus, under the dashboard model, a
70. See McKinsey & Co., Two Routes to Digital Success in Capital Markets 20–21 (Corp. &
Inv. Banking, Working Paper No. 10, 2015).
71. See id. at 21.
72. See id. at 25–26.
73. See id. at 22.
74. See PWC, STATE OFCOMPLIANCE, supra note 46, at 15, 22.
75. See Henry Engler, Dashboard Compliance: Automation Push May Carry Unforeseen
Risks, THOMSON REUTERS (July 13, 2016), http://thomsonreuters.lookbookhq.com/regulatory-
change-2016/DashboardComplianceAutomationPushMayCarryUnforeseenRisks (referring to
industry sources who discuss this trade-off).
76. See Fanto, supra note 10.
77. See, e.g., Press Release, Compliance Made Easy: Introducing the Bloomberg Compliance
Center, CMPC (Dec. 17, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/company/announcements/
compliance-made-easy-introducing-the-bloomberg-compliance-center-cmpc/ (providing, among
other things, real time review of electronic communications).
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compliance officer becomes a somewhat remote figure—not unlike the
security guard who monitors a building behind screens of different
locations and activities—generally engaged in legal compliance.
Is dashboard compliance, with its enhanced efficiency, the kind of
compliance model that the use of technology is producing? There is
evidence of its existence from reported SEC and FINRA enforcement
actions. In the Citigroup case mentioned above, the SEC observed that part
of the firm’s failure to monitor its proprietary trading desks was due to the
situation of the “Information Barriers Surveillance Group,” which is part of
the firm’s compliance function. For cost savings, Citigroup had moved that
group from New York City, where it had been located close to the trading
desks, to Buffalo, where it monitored proprietary trading remotely.78 The
case thus presents both the dashboard model in action and one of its
potential problems—the lack of a physical presence by the compliance
officer, which is further explored below.
Another good example of dashboard compliance appears in an SEC
enforcement action against the broker-dealer Wells Fargo Advisers.79 In this
case, a broker in the Miami branch of the firm and several of his clients
acquired a significant position in Burger King, which was subsequently the
target of an acquisition offer by a private equity firm. It turned out that the
broker had received inside information from another of his customers and
had passed it along to his clients, and they had all made significant profits
from their purchase of Burger King shares.80
Under the law, a broker-dealer must have procedures to prevent insider
trading.81 In accordance with the firm’s procedures, a compliance officer in
the Miami branch, Judy Wolf, conducted a “look back” review of purchases
of Burger King securities before the announcement of the deal. She
discovered a number of suspicious factors: the broker and his clients had
the top holdings of Burger King stock in all of Wells Fargo; they had
bought the stock within ten days before the announcement of the
acquisition; they had made significant profits; Burger King was located in
Miami; and the broker and his customers were all Brazilian. Wolf
concluded, nonetheless, that there was no problem with the stock purchases
and closed the review without any findings.82 Subsequently, the SEC
78. See Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 75,729, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 4178, 2015 WL 4931787, at *4 (Aug. 19, 2015) (noting that “[t]his move
generated cost savings, but also required the hiring of new personnel and resulted in the
surveillance personnel being geographically separated from other CGMI departments”). Citigroup
eventually brought this surveillance group back to Jersey City, New Jersey. Id.
79. See generally Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 73,175, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 3928, 2014 WL 4678598 (Sept. 22, 2014).
80. See id. at *8.
81. See Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 11, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78o(g) (2012)).
82. See Wells Fargo, 2014 WL 4678598, at *8.
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brought an action against the broker and his clients for insider trading and
began to look into Wells Fargo’s conduct in the case. Alerted to the SEC’s
investigation, Wolf “redrafted” her initial compliance memorandum to
suggest that she had arrived at the “no findings” determination because
there were rumors about the acquisition at the time of the stock purchases in
question. In a separate enforcement action, the SEC successfully charged
her with falsifying the compliance records.83
The action against Wells Fargo for its failure to prevent or detect
insider trading highlights the existence of dashboard compliance in the firm,
as well as the SEC’s conclusion that the compliance did not go far enough.
It is clear from the SEC’s recitation of the facts in its settlement with Wells
Fargo that the firm had dashboard compliance. In fact, it had two kinds of
remote compliance in its main office (as opposed to in its Miami branch).
First, it had a central supervision unit that was tasked with ensuring that
branch office personnel did not commit violations of the securities laws,
which it did by conducting a daily review of trades and emails.84 Second, it
had a centralized anti-money laundering (AML) unit that reviewed accounts
for “unusual activity,” including insider trading.85 The SEC contended that
these two units should have coordinated their review, especially since the
AML unit had picked up the transfer of funds for the purchase of the Burger
King securities in the broker’s account, and the central supervision unit had
generated alerts about the concentration of these securities in the accounts
of the broker and his customers.86 The SEC’s message was relatively clear:
83. See In re Wolf, Release No. 851, 2015 WL 4639230, *7–10 (Admin. Proc., Aug. 5,
2015)(describing her falsification of the compliance records). However, the administrative law
judge hearing the case declined to impose any penalty upon her, concluding, among other things,
that she had been punished enough, since she would never again find a position in the industry. In
fact, the ALJ remarks on the compliance officer position and its risks were notable:
In my experience, firms tend to compensate compliance personnel relatively poorly,
especially compared to other associated persons possessing the supervisory securities
licenses compliance personnel typically have, likely because their work does not
generate profits directly. But because of their responsibilities, compliance personnel
receive a great deal of attention in investigations, and every time a violation is detected
there is, quite naturally, a tendency for investigators to inquire into the reasons that
compliance did not detect the violation first, or prevent it from happening at all. The
temptation to look to compliance for the “low hanging fruit,” however, should be
resisted.
Id. at *23. This case generated some attention in the compliance community since it raised the
issue about how compliance officers should add to compliance memoranda or records that
memorialize the results of their monitoring and investigations, which is essentially what Wolf was
doing. In her case, when amending her initial report of “no finding,” she did not clarify when her
amendment was done, suggesting that she was trying to hide her previous flawed investigation.
See id. at *9. One could imagine, however, a compliance officer writing a “bare bones”
memorandum at first, and then filling it in with more detail later.
84. See Wells Fargo, 2014 WL 4678598, at *4.
85. See id. at *8.
86. See id. at *8–9.
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it approved of the centralized and remote compliance units; it just wanted
them to coordinate their work with each other and with the compliance
officers in the field.
As one might expect, there is no mention of a decline in the number of
compliance officers as a result of dashboard compliance in these
enforcement actions. Of course, even when the SEC or FINRA criticizes a
firm for not having adequate technological monitoring, it is unlikely that
they would ever accuse the firm of having too many compliance officers. A
FINRA settlement with Fidelity Brokerage is interesting in this respect.87
Fidelity failed to identify a fraudulent scheme where an individual
pretended to be a Fidelity broker, opened joint accounts with elderly
Fidelity clients, transferred funds out of the clients’ individual accounts into
the joint ones, and then moved the funds from the joint accounts into the
fraudster’s individual accounts. The SEC blamed Fidelity for having
inadequate automated surveillance technology, because in its view this kind
of technology would have identified and flagged the number of joint
accounts with the same email and physical addresses and the suspicious
movements of funds into and out of these accounts. Indeed, while the fraud
was ongoing, Fidelity changed its surveillance technology to identify this
kind of suspicious activity.88
However, as the SEC observed, Fidelity had assigned only one
compliance officer, who was busy with other work at the time of the fraud,
to look at the alerts generated by this technological tool, and the backlog in
the officer’s work delayed the review of an alert generated by the
fraudster’s multiple accounts.89 The message of this case thus runs counter
to the hypothesis stated above, for the dashboard compliance here would
require more, not fewer, compliance officers. Intriguingly, however,
FINRA’s settlement with Fidelity called for only enhancements to the
technology, not for more compliance officer hires.90
The Fidelity case is a reminder that caution should be taken as to the
conclusion that compliance officers’ use of dashboard compliance will
necessarily result in a decline in their numbers. After all, as that case also
suggests, the outcome could be different. A firm might need more, rather
than fewer, compliance officers, albeit those with a technological
background. After all, there is considerable expertise required to be a
compliance officer for certain broker-dealers and investment advisers, such
as those dealing in high frequency trading. In a relatively recent case, a firm
engaged in this kind of trading was disciplined for, among other things,
having a coding error that resulted in many of its trades being made in
87. See, e.g., FINRA Acceptance, Waiver and Consent, Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC, No.
2014041374401 (Dec. 18, 2015) (This is the FINRA version of a settlement.).
88. See id. at 4.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 13 (Fidelity’s Corrective Action Statement).
20 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 11
violation of Regulation National Market System (Regulation NMS).91 A
compliance officer in this situation would have had to be familiar enough
with the firm’s algorithmic trading strategies to understand where they
could go astray and then would have had to monitor their use. Indeed, in a
recent notice to its members, FINRA listed the many supervisory and
compliance tasks associated with the use of algorithmic trading strategies,
which all indicate how much technological understanding and training,
including familiarity with the coding involved in the trading, that a
compliance officer must have.92 One result might be just that
technologically sophisticated compliance officers replace existing ones, not
that the number of compliance officers shrinks.
In sum, the picture is mixed regarding the productivity and employment
effects from compliance officers’ use of dashboard compliance, although
the evidence presented here is far from comprehensive. All signs indicate
that technology is enhancing the productivity of compliance officers in a
challenging environment where firms are looking to cut costs. Dashboard
compliance is the resulting outcome. Again, this model has the compliance
officer checking on the firm’s activities, generally at a central office away
from branches and other locations, as data is fed into the dashboard that, if
all goes well, highlights problems or exceptions for the compliance officer
to investigate. This use may result in a loss of compliance officer
positions—or perhaps the replacement of existing ones with others having a
technological background—but the exact outcome is unclear.
C. IS THEREANY EFFECT ONVALUESCOMPLIANCE?
The third and final inquiry asks whether there is any evidence that the
technology-inspired increased productivity and decreased number of
compliance officers (if such is happening) are having any effect on values
compliance. This is a daunting empirical task because one would have to
show that compliance officers’ focus on legal compliance, coupled with a
decline in their numbers, resulted in their having less time or opportunity to
engage in values compliance. Then, this data would have to show a causal
connection to an increase in employee misconduct in firms. Clearly, this
inquiry would demand both a considerable amount of evidence (i.e.,
movement of compliance officers into remote surveillance units, their
increased productivity, the decline in their numbers, the shift in their
compliance priorities, the increase in misconduct) and the expertise to test
it. In addition, there would be a need to demonstrate that other explanations
91. Latour Trading LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 76,029, 2015 WL 5729485 (Sept. 30,
2015). The error made the firm “trade through” the best available quotations, which means doing
trades at prices other than the ones deemed to be the best under the regulation. Id. at *3.
92. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., EQUITY TRADING INITIATIVES: SUPERVISION AND
CONTROL PRACTICES FOR ALGORITHMIC TRADING STRATEGIES, REG. NOTICENO. 15-09 (2015).
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(e.g., cost pressure alone accounting for a decrease in the number of
compliance officers) do not account for any results that emerge.
One purpose of this Article is to highlight the inquiry and suggest the
data that would be useful to gather, although it is not easily available.93
Some evidence exists that compliance officers are paying less attention
today to values compliance. For example, former SEC Commissioner
Daniel M. Gallagher expressed his concern that compliance officers would
reduce their face-to-face advice to brokers and advisers, but he did not
attribute this to dashboard compliance. Rather, he explained the
phenomenon as resulting from compliance officers’ fear of incurring
supervisory liability.94
Important findings on values compliance in broker-dealers may emerge
from FINRA’s current, but limited, review of how firms promote and
maintain an appropriate culture.95 In this review, FINRA is specifically
asking firms, among other things, how their compliance officers
“establish[], communicat[e] and implement[][the] firm’s cultural values.”96
This is an explicit statement about the role of compliance officers in the
creation of values compliance. Any resulting report from FINRA after this
examination could be invaluable in showing what is actually happening in
broker-dealers, particularly with respect to values, as opposed to legal,
compliance.
It is also possible that evidence will eventually show that the result of
dashboard compliance could be an enhancement, rather than a reduction, of
values compliance. One consultant urges firms to outsource monitoring and
testing to a specialized provider that can use data analytics and other
technology solutions to review the information and then feed the key
findings back to the firm’s compliance dashboard.97 This would have the
advantage of enhancing the monitoring and testing capabilities of
compliance in a given firm, but would also free up compliance officers to
93. There are useful surveys available about what compliance officers do. See, e.g., N.Y.
STOCK EXCH. GOVERNANCE SERVS. & SOC’Y OF CORP. COMPLIANCE & ETHICS, COMPLIANCE
AND ETHICS PROGRAM ENVIRONMENT REPORT (2014) (presenting results of a survey of
compliance officers).
94. See Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Introductory Remarks at the
Evolving Role of Compliance in the Securities Industry Presentation, Washington, D.C. (May 12,
2014). I discuss this issue of supervisory liability of compliance officers elsewhere. See Fanto,
supra note 14, at 1121.
95. See Establishing, Communicating and Implementing Cultural Values, FIN. INDUSTRY REG.
AUTHORITY (Feb. 2016), http://www.finra.org/industry/establishing-communicating-and-implem
enting-cultural-values.
96. Id.
97. See PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, ENABLING PERFORMANCE THROUGH ADVANCED
MONITORING AND TESTINGAMONITORING AND TESTING SOLUTION FOR THE PHARMACEUTICAL
AND LIFE SCIENCES INDUSTRY 3 (2015) (By leveraging outside expertise, companies can
potentially reduce infrastructure costs, increase productivity, and/or refocus in-house resources
onto mission-critical business drivers instead of required non core monitoring and testing
activities.). Of course, PWC is promoting its data analytics products here.
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do the more highly valued work of responding to problems and to providing
advice, counseling, and strategic planning; in other words, doing values
compliance. This suggests a “liberating” technology story, where a central
surveillance unit (or a highly competent third party) works hand-in-hand
with “on the ground” compliance officers, who can continue to “walk the
halls.”98 This is what should have happened in the Wells Fargo case
discussed above, had the Miami branch compliance officer been more
competent; the supervisory units would have alerted her to problems
regarding insider trading, which she would have investigated.99
As has probably been true in previous cases of compliance officers’ use
of new technology, the outcome of the introduction of dashboard
compliance will take some time to produce its results. In earlier work, I
assumed that enhanced monitoring enabled by technology clearly posed a
threat to values compliance.100 My fear was that, just as compliance was
rising to prominence, circumstances like technology, supervisory liability,
and cost pressures on firms would push it back into an operational role. The
result would be that compliance officers would assist supervisors within a
central supervisory unit, but they would become increasingly remote from
brokers and advisers. This would lessen or even eliminate their important
role in values compliance. However, as the above discussion suggests, a
different outcome may result from the current intersection of compliance
and technology.
CONCLUSION
This Article serves as an introduction to this issue on the interaction
between compliance and technology, just as the talk upon which it was
based did for the Brooklyn Law School conference. Part I began by
explaining the origin of compliance in broker-dealers and investment
advisers and its important current position in those firms. It underscored
how compliance officers assist the firm and its supervisors in establishing
their defense to a charge of supervisory liability when a violation of the
securities laws occurs. Part I then discussed why compliance officers have
always been drawn to technology, particularly to keep up with the business
sides of the firms they work for. Today, compliance officers in broker-
dealers and investment advisers have a particular need for technological
98. See Donohue, supra note 25 (recommending that, as one of the ways to get comfortable
about the firm, a compliance officer should “[w]alk the floor”).
99. At the conference, I discussed the alternative outcomes of “dashboard compliance” with
the compliance officers and compliance advisers present. They assured me that my negative
scenario of decreased employment of compliance officers and isolation of them into remote
centers was unlikely to be the result of dashboards. Rather they think of the dashboard as just
another “liberating” tool in the toolbox of compliance officers. They told me that my negative
outcome exaggerates the cost pressures facing firms on compliance and that employment in the
field remains robust.
100. See Fanto, supra note 14, at 1148–60.
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assistance, because they must establish procedures for proper conduct of
business practices and monitor compliance with them, and these practices in
financial firms are using sophisticated technology. Compliance officers are
just doing what they have always done by using dashboard compliance as a
new model.
Part II set forth the questions inspiring the conference, chiefly, what
will be the effect of the use of new technology on compliance? In particular,
it asked whether dashboard compliance would be an unalloyed benefit, that
is, a useful tool that would make compliance officers more productive, or
have negative effects. Such possible effects include the downsizing of
compliance officer positions and their movement away from the floor to
remote locations, where they sit behind dashboards monitoring firm
activities. Part II offered a hypothesis: that more use of dashboard
compliance would increase the productivity of compliance officers,
decrease their numbers, emphasize legal compliance, and diminish values
compliance. Part II concluded by proposing ways of “testing” that
hypothesis.
Part III considered readily available evidence supporting or refuting the
hypothesis, generally from industry surveys and administrative actions. The
first section observed that compliance officers are finding it necessary to
use dashboard compliance, and that the SEC and FINRA are encouraging
this use. Indeed, these regulators have sent their message of encouragement
by providing compliance officers with examples in the regulators’ own
surveillance of firms and by pointing out in administrative proceedings
deficiencies in firms’ use of technology in compliance. The second section
in Part III observed that, according to industry reports, dashboard
compliance is making compliance officers more productive. The evidence
also suggested, though weakly, that this productivity might result in a loss
of compliance officer positions, as firms make investments in technology at
the expense of hiring or retaining human compliance officers. Finally, the
third section in Part III revealed that there was little evidence so far about a
negative effect on values compliance from the use of dashboard
compliance. Other outcomes are possible, such as dashboard compliance
liberating compliance officers from many mundane tasks, meaning that they
instead have more time for values compliance.
Compliance is being disrupted today, at least in broker-dealers and
investment advisers, because of dashboard compliance. The story of
compliance up to the present has been one of its gaining increasing
authority and recognition among firms and regulators. By enhancing
productivity, dashboard compliance can continue overall compliance along
this triumphant path. However, because technology invariably shapes
attitudes and conduct, it is necessary to be alert to the ways in which
dashboard compliance could reinforce certain compliance tasks, such as
legal compliance, and undercut others, such as values compliance. Even if
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the ultimate outcome of the use of dashboard compliance is not now fully
clear, compliance officers and scholars should remain alert to its possible
effects to ensure that all that is valuable about compliance is maintained.
